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USE OF THE CONTAINING SPACE AFTER THE REMOVAL
OF SUBSURFACE MINERALS
ROBERT T. DONLEY*

TWO recent West Virginia cases-one expressly, and the other
inferentially-again bring to prominence the much-debated question of who has the "ownership" of the space remaining after the
removal of subsurface minerals where there has been a severance
in title of them from the other strata. It may be remarked, at the
outset, that the results reached by the courts are the same whether
the title of the mineral owner be granted to him or whether it be
excepted by him from a grant of the land.
The discussion which will follow is not in the spirit of adverse
criticism of the very able opinions in these cases, nor of the cogent
dissent in the Fisher case. Rather, it is offered with the hope tha.
further analysis will throw additional light upon the problems
involved and suggest some limitations and qualifications of the
space doctrine which may not be readily apparent from a casual
reading of the opinions.
THm COAL CASE

A simple case may be stated thus: 0, the owner in fee of a
tract of land from the center of the earth to the heavens, conveys
to G, grantee, all the underlying coal. (The deed usually provides
that G is also granted such mining privileges as are reasonably
necessary for the mining, removal and marketing of the coal,
although such a grant is unnecessary and will be implied.) 3 After
G has removed part of his coal, leaving supporting ribs and pillars
of recoverable coal, he desires to use the passageways for the transportation of coal from other lands owned or leased by him.
Whereupon, 0 claims a continuing trespass and either seeks damages in an action at law or an injunction and accounting in a suit
in equity.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has now decided,
for the first time, that in the case stated the owner of the coal (or
his lessee) may use the subterranean passageways for the transportation of coal mined from adjacent lands, subject to three qualifica* Member of the Monongalia County Bar; Professor of Law, West Virginia
University.
1 Fisher v. West Virginia Coal & Transportation Co., 73 S.E.2d 63 (W. Va.
1952). Given, J. dissented, preferring the Virginia view: Clayborn v. Camilla
Red Ash Coal Co., 128 Va. 383, 105 S.E. 117 (1920).
2Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952).
3 Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W. Va. 807, 121 S.E. 90 (1924).
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tions or limitations: (1) the coal must not be exhausted; (2) it
must not be "abandoned"; and (3) the4mining of the granted coal
must be prosecuted with due diligence.
This decision was reached upon the ground that two prior
West Virginia cases had "committed" the court to the doctrine
enunciated in two Pennsylvania cases: Lillibridge v. Lackawanna
Coal Co.,8 and Webber v. Vogel." It therefore becomes necessary
to examine all four cases with a view to discussing (a) whether the
West Virginia court was irrevocably so committed and (b) the
exact limitations and qualifications of the so-called Pennsylvania
doctrine.
The first of the two West Virginia cases cited as committing
the court is Armstrong v. Maryland Coal Co. 7 It was not necessary
to the decision of that case either to adopt or to reject the Pennsylvania view, for the reason that under the facts the vendor's
deeds all contained a grant of the privilege to transport coterminous
coal. Any views expressed, it is submitted, must be regarded
as dicta. However, even if regarded as a binding precedent, it was
said in the Armstrong case:
"In Webber v. Vogel, it was thought that the language of
the Lillibridge case might imply that the right of way would
continue even after the exhaustion of all of the coal. This
notion was disapproved and the right to haul coal from adjoining lands limited to the time when the coal in the land so
traversed should be removed. But, as is suggested in argument, this limitation could easily be provided against by
leaving some of the coal unmined until the coal from adjoining tracts could be removed, and that if need be a few pillars
could be left for subjacent support, which would answer all
8
the requirements."
The second West Virginia case cited as committing the court
to the Pennsylvania doctrine is Robinson v. Wheeling Steel & Iron
Co." This case is not strictly in point for the reason that the owner
of the coal also owned all the strata below and part of the strata
above the coal to a layer near the surface. It was stated in the
opinion that the owner of the coal could use the passageways with
this important limitation: "in such manner as will not unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment by the plaintiff of his interest in
4 Fisher v. West Virginia Coal & Transportation Co., 73 SE.2d 633 (W. Va.

1952).

5 143 Pa. 293, 22 Atl. 1035, 13 L.RA. 627 (1891).

6 189 Pa. 156, 42 Ad. 4 (1899).
7 67 W. Va. 589, 60 S.E. 195 (1910).
8 Italics supplied.
9 99 W. Va. 435, 129 S.E. 311 (1925).
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the land." However, this limitation is not carried into the syllabus.
Moreover, the bill of complaint alleged that the coal had been
completely exhausted. Notwithstanding this fact, the court interpreted the Lillibridge and Webber cases as holding that the owner
of the coal could use the passageways until exhaustion of the
coal, and cited an Illinois case10 for the proposition that the
owner of the coal could use the containing space in any way that
he sees fit. It also mentioned the English view that the owner of
the coal has the property and exclusive right to possession in the
whole space and is entitled to use the same for all purposes.
From these conflicting statements in the two West Virginia
cases,11 it will be observed that there is agreement upon the element
of exhaustion of the coal as the fact which terminates the right to
use the containing space for the transportation of coal from other
tracts. They do not, it is submitted, purport to enunciate-much
less "commit" the court to- (1) the alternative fact of abandonment, and (2) the additional fact of nonprosecution of operations
with due diligence.
The next inquiry, then, is whether the Pennsylvania cases,
properly interpreted, require the absence of the two facts last
above mentioned. While the Lillibridgel2 case is regarded as the
fountainhead of the majority rule in the United States, and has
been cited in virtually every subsequent case' 3 dealing with the
point, it has been a source of amazement to the writer that it has
been so cited both in later Pennsylvania cases and elsewhere,
uncritically and without apparent realization of the peculiar facts
involved in it. These facts are:
(1) The granting clause in the deed conveying the coal was
limited to "all merchantable coal" in the tract. Therefore, it is
at least arguable that the grantee did not become vested with title
to all the coal, but with only part of it. In West Virginia,
"merchantable" coal means coal so situate that it may be profitably
mined and of such quality as to be salable. 4
(2) The habendum clause (in the Lillibridge case) provided
that the grantee was "to have and to hold the coal in and under
said land unto the [grantee] its successors and assigns, until the

1o Attebery v. Blair, 244 Ill. 363, 91 N.E. 475 (1910).

11 Notes 7 and 9 supra.
12 Note 5 supra.
13 See Annotation, 15 A.L.R. 957.

1t Tressler Coal Mining Co. v. Klefeld, 125 W. Va. 301, 24 S.E.2d 98, 49 W.
VA. L.Q. 173 (1943).
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exhaustion thereof15 under the terms of this indenture." Therefore,
the grantee became vested not with a fee simple title to the coal but
only with a determinable fee. The estate ended upon the happening of the specified event, viz., the exhaustion of the coal. 6
It must be conceded that the Pennsylvania court did not base
its decision upon the two limitations-one of quality of the subject-matter and one of duration of the estate-above discussed.
However, it did point out that the plaintiffs Bill of Complaint
contained no allegation that all the coal had been removed and
no allegation that the tunnel was being maintained on the rock
bed beneath the coal.
The Webber case 17 recognized the doctrine of the Lillibridge
case as establishing "a settled rule of property", but stated that it
was not to be extended beyond what was plainly decided therein.
It may also be remarked that the Webber case has likewise been
uncritically cited without reference to the limitations and qualifications set forth in it, which appear from the following quotation:
"While there exists by the deed to the grantee an estate
in fee simple of the severed coal, and his right to the space
mined out will not be distinguished from that in which the
coal remains unmined, that estate, except in very rare cases,
has no badge of perpetuity. In nearly every case the instrument itself discloses the intention of the parties that the coal
shall be mined; that is, that the subject of the grant shall soon
be exhausted or consumed. It is severed from the under
and overlying land for the purpose of turning it into money.
It would not only be a perversion of the intention to merely
use such an estate to reach other coal, but such use would
be a continual menace to the stability of the surface. No
owner of the upper land could tell when his estate would cease
to be disturbed by workings underneath. It was intended to
go no further in the case cited [Lillibridge] than to hold
that, while the purchaser of the coal was in good faith mining
out his coal, his right to the use of the space made vacant by
his workings as they progressed could not be successfully
obstructed by the owner of the surface; and not that by the
purchase of the coal he obtained an undisputed and perpetual
right of way under another's land. The owner of the land
above and below has a right to the reversion of the space
occupied by the coal within a time contemplated by the parties
when they sever that peculiar part of the land from its
horizontal adjoiners."' 8
15 Italics supplied.

16 Cf. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hill, 112 W. Va. 10, 163 S.E. 613 (1932).
17 Note 6 supra.
18 Italics supplied.
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It thus appears that, as disclosed by the italicized words above,
the purported limitation of the Lillibridge doctrine was upon the
theory that as disclosed by the deed of conveyance, the parties
intend a grant for a limited time only. So, the doctrine that the
space reverts to the grantor of the coal is really based upon "the
contemplation of the parties." As previously pointed out, this was
true in the Lillibridge case because the grantee there acquired
only a determinable fee. But it is submitted that there is no justification for inventing a fictional doctrine of a grant for a limited
time where the deed conveys the coal in fee simple without limitation as to quantity or quality of the coal, or of duration of the
estate. It is common knowledge that coal fields are acquired in
large blocks with a view to development many years in the future.
It is believed that no court ever held or suggested that, in the
absence of appropriate stipulation in the deed, the grantee of a
fee simple estate owes any implied duty of development to the
grantor, nor that the right to the use of the containing space is
limited in time measured from the date of the deed. If the owner is
under no duty of development, i.e., if he can rightfully postpone
the beginning of operations, why, after such beginning, is he under
a duty to proceed with reasonable diligence? No rational answer
can be given to this question.
The confusion in the Pennsylvania doctrine thus introduced
by the Webber case made it necessary for the court to attempt a
clarification in Westerman v. Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co.19 There,
referring to the Lillibridge case, it was said that the court "held
that the owner of the coal also owned the chamber or space
enclosing it, and, so long as such ownership continued, could use
such space for the transportation of other coal."
"We do not understand the language of the opinion in
Webber v. Vogel, supra, to limit such right of transportation
to the precise time that coal is being mined on the tract in
question. Of course, defendant's right in the plaintiff's farm
will terminate as soon as the minable coal therein has been
removed . . . .the coal in the ribs was not forfeited because
left for a time to support the surface . . . .Neither the coal
nor the space reverts to plaintiff because of such temporary
suspension of mining. The deed gives defendant the coal,
without any restriction as to the time when it shall be mined; so
there is nothing upon which to base any claim of reversion... . 0
Defendant has no perpetual right of way through plaintiff's
19260
Pa. 140, 103 At. 539, 15 A.L.R. 843 (1918).
2
oItalics supplied.
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land; its right will cease when the coal therein is exhausted
or abandoned."
What is meant by "temporary suspension of mining"? It is
submitted that this expression refers to non-exhaustion of the coal
rather than to intermittent operation. In other words, until the
coal is exhausted, the owner may mine whenever he pleases, and
from time to time, over an unlimited period and all intervals
between operations until all the recoverable coal is gone are mere
temporary suspensions. This is necessarily the case because any
other view would have to be based upon an implied duty of
development for which there is no justifiable legal foundation.
Thus, it is unsound to convert the privilege of suspension of operations-in the sense stated-into a duty to prosecute mining with
reasonable diligence.
What is meant by "abandoned"? Since it is conceded everywhere that the owner in fee of coal acquires a corporeal hereditament, it must likewise be conceded that he cannot lose title to it
under the doctrine of abandonment. Title to personal property
and to incorporeal rights may, indeed, be so lost.21 But under the
theory of the Pennsylvania cases, the use of the tunnels is not the
exercise of an incorporeal right, such as an easement, in the
property of another. The owner of the coal owns the space enclosing it so long as his ownership of the coal continues, says the
Westerman case. 22 In this view, then, the word "abandoned"
must be interpreted as merely synonymous with "exhausted". It
cannot properly mean abandonment in the sense of loss of title by
nonuser, because title to corporeal property cannot be divested in
such a way.
To summarize, it is the writer's contention that the Pennsylvania cases, in the light of the facts therein involved and closely
limited by the language of the opinions, and as finally interpreted
in the Westerman case, established the doctrine in that jurisdiction
that, in the absence of anything in the deed expressly or by necessary implication to the contrary, the grantee of the coal, in fee
simple, has the absolute privilege to use the passageways therein
for the transportation of other coal until the exhaustion of the
granted coal. The privilege is not lost by "abandonment" except
as that term means permanent abandonment-not of the coal-but
abandonment of operations by reason of exhaustion of the recover21 For example, a leasehold estate may be ended by abandonment; Bluestone Coal Co. v. Bell, 38 W. Va. 297, 18 S.E. 493 (1893); Parish Fork Oil Co.
v. Bridgewater, 51 W. Va. 583, 42 S.E. 655 (1902).
22 Note 19 supra.
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able coal. Nor is it lost by any failure to continue mining with
due diligence.
It is submitted, therefore, with all deference, that the Fisher
case should not have gone further in stating the Pennsylvania
rule thus: "so long as the coal . . . is neither exhausted nor
abandoned, and mining is being prosecuted with due diligence
...the owner of such coal, may use the subterranean passageways
for the transportation of coal mined from adjacent lands. ..."
In a word, the factors of "abandonment" and of failure to prosecute operations with diligence should have been omitted. If this
had been done we would have a principle of law which-irrespective
of its theoretical soundness-would be relatively simple to apply.
Whether or not a seam of coal is exhausted can be proved with
reasonable facility and certainty. Not so of "abandonment"which even if legally possible, involves a matter of intention-nor
of "due diligence", where the test may be either subjective or objective, as demonstrated by the confusing decisions in oil and gas
23
lease cases.
DISCUSSION OF THE SPACE-OWNERSHIP THEORY

If, under the doctrine discussed, the owner of the coal loses
his privilege to use the passageways upon exhaustion of the recoverable coal, who has the right to complain if such use unlawfully
continues? The cases have involved claims made by the owner
of the overlying strata, including the "surface" 24 who also owned
the underlying strata, usually upon the ground that the continued
use of the passageways was either actually damaging the surface or
constituting a "continual menace" to its stability. A brief analysis
will show that such division of ownership of the strata is not
necessarily the case.
Suppose that 0, the owner in fee simple of a tract of land from
the center of the earth to the heavens, makes the following conveyances:
(1) 0 conveys to A "all the strata overlying the Pittsburgh
seam of coal". Then,
(2) 0 conveys to B "all the strata underlying the Pittsburgh
seam of coal". Then,
(3)0 conveys to C "all the Pittsburgh seam of coal."
If C exhausts the coal, who "owns" the space formerly occupied by it? There could not, it is submitted, be a "reverter"
23 See discussion in DONLEY, LAW OF COAL, OIL AND GAS IN WEsT VIRGINIA
AND VIRGINIA § 108 (1951).

24 Id. at § 80.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1953

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
either to A or B because neither at any time became vested with
any interest in the coal or in the space occupied by it. The statement in Webber v. Vogel 25 that "the owner of the land above and
below has a right to the reversion of the space occupied by the
coal", was based upon a different situation, where 0, the owner in
fee, conveyed only the coal to C, retaining title to the strata above
and below. The theory advanced by Professor Simonton was that
C received no title to the containing space because he acquired
nothing but the coal.2 6 But in the case previously supposed, following the same line of reasoning, neither A nor B received title
to the containing space because they acquired, respectively, 'nothing
but the overlying and underlying strata. If this be true, and if C
as owner of the coal, loses the space upon exhaustion of the coal,
then it would seem that the "ownership" of the space would
"revert" to 0-who has no other interest in the entire tract, and as
appurtenant to nothing. The result thus reached would be
analogous to the Pennsylvania doctrine of the "third estate", which
the writer has elsewhere sought to show is unsound.2 7 If, in the
case supposed, the court rejects the claims of 0 and of C, will it
then choose between A and B, or will it decide that, as respective
owners of the overlying and underlying strata, they are cotenants
of the containing space? How shall any damages arising from
wrongful user be apportioned? If B is willing to permit C to continue to use the tunnels, but A is not, whose decision shall govern?
The absurdities and inconsistencies suggested are sufficient to
make one wish that the whole doctrine had been originally rejected and that the American courts had adopted the simple,
workable rule that the owner of coal owns the space remaining
after its exhaustion, in accordance with the English view. The
writer has not found a case in which the surface owner has been
subjected to any substantial damage by the continued use of the
subterranean passageways. Some courts have held that the measure of damages for a continuing trespass is the worth of the use
of the property and have allowed recovery of the customary
"haulage royalty" or "way leave." 28 The West Virginia court has
cited with approval a Pennsylvania case 29 holding that the measure
of damages is nominal, in the absence of proof of actual harm. 30
25 Note 6 supra.
26 Note, 32 W. VA.

L.Q. 242 (1926).

op. cit. supra note 23, at § 29.
s Ouality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Reeves, 206 Ark. 713, 177 S.W.2d 728 (1944).
29 Springer v. J. H. Somers Fuel Co., 196 Pa. 156, 46 At. 370 (1900).
27 DONLEY,

30 Chafin

v. Gay Coal & Coke Co., 113 W. Va. 823, 169 S.E. 485 (1933).
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This seems to be the preferable rule. What legal or moral justification is there for imposing upon the coal operator the additional
economic burden of a "way leave" of 2# or 3 or more per ton in
order to put it into the pocket of the surface owner who is not
being harmed in any degree by the use of the subterranean passageways, and who, in all probability, was not cognizant of the legal
situation until so advised by astute counsel? For the same reasons,
the court should refuse to grant an injunction where the harm
to the coal operator in stopping his use of the passageways will
greatly outweigh the benefit to be derived by the surface owner.
This is a case distinctly calling for the application of the "balance
of convenience" rule, for which there is ample precedent in West
Virginia.3 .
To conclude this phase of the discussion: even if the coal
owner may lose the use of the passageways under the doctrine laid
down in the Fisher case, 32 if the court adopts the rules above mentioned (1) limiting recovery at law to nominal damages; and (2)
refusing to grant an injunction, it may well be that the coal operator is not, from a practical standpoint, adversely affected by the
decision.
CONTAINING SPACE IN OIL AND GAS CASES

In Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co.,33 the owner in fee simple of
a tract of land from the center of the earth to the heavens, conveyed it to A, expressly excepting and reserving the oil and gas,
with the exclusive right to drill for production thereof and the
usual incidental rights of way and other privileges. 0 thereafter
conveyed an undivided interest in the oil and gas, and he and his
cotenants leased the same to G for oil and gas purposes by a
standard form of lease. On the same date, 0 and his cotenants
entered into an agreement with G, granting to the latter the exclusive right to use and occupy the Big Lime stratum underlying the
tract for the purpose of injecting and storing gas therein and all
other rights necessary in the operation of the property for storage
purposes, alone or in conjunction with neighboring lands. Thereafter G drilled a well from which no oil or gas has been produced,
into the Big Lime stratum and used it for pumping gas produced
from other lands into said stratum for storage. A, alleging that there
is no recoverable oil or gas in the Big Lime stratum, sought an
injunction to restrain G's use thereof for such purposes, a cancella31 Note, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 155 (1939).
32
33 Note 1 supra.

Note 2 supra.
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tion of the gas storage agreement as a cloud on his title, and a
decree for the value of the use of the premises. A demurrer to the
bill of complaint was overruled and it was held that A was vested
with title to the Big Lime stratum (since O's deed excepted and
reserved the oil and gas and not the limestone) and that a court
of equity had jurisdiction to remove cloud on title and to enjoin
relief
a continuing trespass; and would proceed to grant complete
34
demand.
legal
a
were
damages
alleged
the
although
In making its decision, the court applied the space doctrine
of the Lillibridge, Webber and Westerman cases, 35 as interpreted
by it, "that so long as there remain recoverable minerals which
are mined in good faith, the space may be used by the owner of the
minerals". It was then concluded that since, under the allegations
of the bill, no recoverable minerals existed in the stratum, 0, as
the owner of the gas (if it formerly was present therein) had no
right to use for storage purposes the space thus vacated by exhaustion, and consequently could not grant such right to G.
It will be noted that the foregoing statement of the Pennsylvania space doctrine differs from that stated in the Fisher case,
in that (1) abandonment as an alternative to exhaustion is omitted
and (2) operation "in good faith" is substituted for "due diligence". 38 Disregarding these variations, and assuming that exhaustion of the recoverable minerals is the determining factor, the
question arises as to whether the space doctrine applicable to coal
and other solid minerals can or should be applied without qualification to those of a vagrant or fugacious nature. To begin with,
the owner of gas underlying land does not own it in the absolute
and unqualified sense that one owns a solid mineral. He may lose
the gas by reason of operations upon adjacent lands. On the
other hand, he may acquire his neighbor's gas by operations on his
own land. The minute spaces between the grains of a porous
stratum may be vacated, (i.e., to the point of nonpractical production) and again refilled, in whole or in part, and this may occur
either through natural migration or through the effect of pumping
or other intervention by the act of man.
34The statement of facts is condensed and the problem of interpreting the
deed is omitted because it is not necessary to the discussion of the principle
involved.
35 Notes 5, 6 and 19 supra.
36 This is not merely a quibble as to the meaning of words. One may
operate in good faith, i.e., a subjective state of mind, and yet not do so with
due diligence, i.e., an objective test measured by what a reasonably prudent
operator would have done in the circumstances.
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While the West Virginia court has committed itself to the
"absolute" ownership theory of oil and gas,3 7 it is nevertheless
true that in substance and effect the "ownership" consists of the
exclusive right to explore and reduce them to possession. "Therefore", said the Kentucky court, "the geological formations or strata
common to this class of minerals may be exhausted a thousand
times and the mineral owner still retain the exclusive right to
take all the minerals which find their way into the formation,
whether through injection or in any other way." 38 Accordingly,
it was held that where the owner of land in fee simple conveyed it,
excepting and reserving the minerals, his grantee has no right to
explore for or to produce them, irrespective of their source. Therefore, such grantee had no right in the stratum which he could
lease to a third person for storage purposes; but the grantor
could do so and is entitled to receive the rental therefor. The
court went on to say that, in this view, it was not necessary to
decide "whether the cavity or stratum from which a [fugacious]
mineral has been removed becomes the property of the mineral or
[of the] surface owner". It is arguable, however, that the court
in effect did decide the question for if the owner of the gas has the
exclusive right from time to time without limitation to extract it,
regardless of its source; and if he likewise has the exclusive right
to enter into a gas storage lease and receive the rentals, it would
seem that he has substantially all the incidents of ownership of the
title to the stratum itself-including the minute spaces between
the particles of rock or sand. And, it necessarily follows from the
decision that exhaustion of the original supply of gas does not
terminate such rights.
Reverting to the Tate case,3 9 the decision embodied in the
syllabus is that where the owner in fee conveys the land, excepting
and reserving the minerals, the deed operates to pass to the
grantee title to the Big Lime stratum from which the minerals have
been extracted. This is, of course, a quite sound conclusion. But
it does not necessarily follow therefrom that because one is the
owner of such stratum he has the exclusive right to the use thereof
for gas storage purposes. Such use may be prevented by reason
of the fact that the storage space becomes occupied by gas from
other lands, as may be demonstrated by the following hypothetical
7
3

Boggess v. Milam, 127 W. Va. 654, 84 S.E.2d 257 (1945).

8 Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood, 252 S.W.2d 866 (Ky.

1952).8

9Note 2 supra.
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case: Suppose that after the delivery of the deed in the Tate
case gas from adjacent lands finds its way into the Big Lime
stratum, either from natural vagrancy or by reason of storage
pressures from operations conducted on other lands. Surely it is
beyond question that the grantor, by virtue of his exception and
reservation of the minerals, has the exclusive right to drill into
that stratum and produce such gas, to the exclusion of the grantee.
The situation would then exist wherein the title to a gas-containing
stratum is vested in one person and the "title" to the gas itself in
another. No trespass would occur by occupancy of the space for
the reason that when the gas is injected through a well located on
other land, the injecting-owner of the gas loses his title to it, as
personal property, and it again becomes part of the real estate
and the title to it, as real estate, becomes vested in the owner of the
gas under any adjacent tract to which it migrates. It has been so
held in Kentucky. 40 The theory is that gas is a mineral ferae
naturae and that its injection into the strata at a place where the
injector has a right to do so, is no more a trespass upon the neighboring strata than it would be if one were to catch a fox and turn
it loose upon his own land, following which the fox wanders onto
his neighbor's land.
Hence, it would be neither illogical nor legally impossible if
the West Virginia court were to hold that the ownership of the gascontaining stratum may be vested in one person and the exclusive
right to extract the gas in another. However, it does not follow
that the latter has the additional privilege to use the surface for
the purpose of injecting such gas, even though it be conceded that
he has necessary surface privileges for removing it after injection.
Therefore, it is submitted that even if the allegations of the
answer in the Tate case that there do exist recoverable minerals
in the Big Lime strata be hereafter proved, such fact would not
establish the right of the defendants to use the surface of the
plaintiff's land for injection purposes. But, it is further submitted
that the defendants cannot be prevented from storing gas in that
stratum so long as injection occurs on other lands where the right
to do so exists. The Tate case does not spell out this distinction
but observes that "in considering the overall implication of the
questions presented ... it is a fair assumption that the exception
made .. . in the deed . . . was for the purpose of mining and
4
0 Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky. 685, 75 S.W.2d
204 (1924). See also Cornwell v. Central Kentucky Gas. Co. 249 S.W.2d 531

(Ky. 1952).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol55/iss3/3

12

Donley: Use of the Containing Space After the Removal of Subsurface Miner
USE OF CONTAINING SPACE
operating the land for the production of minerals. Now [the
grantors] are seeking to utilize their ownership rights and privileges provided for in that exception for a different purpose, i.e.,
the storage of gas produced elsewhere." 41
It is submitted that this is a valid distinction (if the court
had said "injection" instead of "storage") because it may fairly be
said that when one buys a tract of land subject to an exception of
the oil and gas, he necessarily contemplates that the surface may
be burdened with production operations. He consents thereto,
either expressly or impliedly, and that consent should not be
limited to operations for producing the gas originally trapped in
the strata but should extend to that thereafter finding its way into
it, whether by natural or by artificial means. He does not consent,
however, that his surface should be subjected to the further burden
of using it for injection purposes. In reaching this conclusion it is
necessary to resort to no more than accepted principles of interpretation of the expressed intent of the parties. The court citedevidently for purposes of comparison or analogy-United Fuel Gas
Co. v. Morley Oil & Gas Co.,42 which held that where a deed conveys land to a school board and provides that it shall be "exclusively appropriated and used as a site for a school house and
school", these words are not merely an expression of the purpose
of the conveyance but constitute a restrictive covenant. There is
no need to resort to this principle in order to reach the result
previously suggested.
To conclude this phase of the discussion: it is submitted that
the Tate case does not necessarily hold that in all cases the mere
use of a subsurface stratum for gas storage purposes constitutes
a continuing trespass thereto which a court of equity will enjoin,
and which will entitle the owner to an accounting for use and
occupancy; nor that it is a trespass of any kind. It is the use
of the surface and other overlying strata for injection purposes
which creates the cause of action and the grounds for equitable
relief.
CONCLUSION

A case is authority for no more than it was actually necessary
for the court to decide with reference to the particular facts
involved.
Therefore, the writer believes that, upon principle, it should
be held that:
4
1.Italics supplied.
42 102 W. Va. 374,

135 S.E. 399 (1926).
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(1) For all practical purposes, the owner of a seam of coal may
almost indefinitely continue to use the passageways therein for
the transportation of coal produced from other lands, without
liability. In this sense, he may be called the owner of the containing space. It is a workable rule if exhaustion of the recoverable
coal is made the sole test for terminating such user.
(2) The owner of the gas underlying a tract of land may
exhaust it and re-exhaust it, indefinitely, irrespective of the source
of the gas or of the manner in which it acquired its situs. He may
also pump gas from other lands into a stratum which will contain it,
irrespective of whether such stratum has previously been exhausted,
so long as the injection process is accomplished through operations
on lands as to which such right of injection exists. These rights
of injection and of removal may be exercised without liability
to the owner of the stratum in which the gas is thus placed.
(3) The owner of the gas underlying a tract of land may not,
merely by virtue of his ownership of such gas, use the surface or
other overlying strata for the purpose of injecting gas produced
from other lands, simply because such use would be an unnecessary
and unreasonable imposition of a burden upon the land which was
not fairly within the contemplation of the parties to the severance
deed.
(4) Because of the fugacious and recurring nature of gas, the
space doctrine applicable to solid minerals cannot be applied to it
without limitation. One person may own the containing stratum
and another own the exclusive right to extract the gas therein
contained, irrespective of its source, and from time to time, as
replaced.
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